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Abstract
This paper reports on a large scale field experiment testing strategies available to a
seller participating in simultaneous competitive sequential, ascending price automobile
auctions. Every other week, the seller offered approximately 120 vehicles for sale in an
auction environment in which several competitive sellers offered on the order of 3,000
vehicles. The experiment tested various sequences in which the seller could offer the
vehicles, such as high values first or low values first. Surprisingly, and contrary to intuition
drawn from the theory of single item and single seller auctions, the worst performing
sequence from those tested is for the seller to order vehicles from highest to lowest values.
The best sequence is to group the vehicles by type and offer the low valued vehicles first
and then move to offer the higher valued vehicles. Our conjecture is that this sequence
reduces the competition with other sellers for the attention of specialized buyers.
JEL classification numbers: D440, L620, L810, C930, C900
Key words: experiments, auctions
 
SEQUENCING STRATEGIES IN LARGE, COMPETITIVE, 
ASCENDING PRICE AUTOMOBILE AUCTIONS:  
AN EXPERIMENTAL EXAMINATION 
 
David M. Grether,  Charles R. Plott 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 
This paper reports the results of a field experiment conducted at a single 
Southern California wholesale automobile auction site. During the latter part 
of 2003 a large seller of vehicles asked the auction house about alternative 
strategies for offering vehicles at auction.  In particular, the seller was 
interested in understanding more about the sequence with which the vehicles 
were presented as well as other variables to which the seller had access. The 
seller was interested in exploring strategies that might increase the revenue 
from the sales.  
 
The seller and auction house asked the authors to design and supervise a 
field experiment to address the question. The seller was offering between 
one hundred and one hundred fifty vehicles every other Thursday.  On these 
sales days, the auction house auctioned approximately three thousand 
vehicles brought to the auction by “our seller” and by other sellers.  The 
auction was open primarily to dealers as buyers and sellers.  The general 
public had very limited access, if any at all. We were allowed to control the 
order with which the seller in question offered the vehicles. The resulting 
experiments were conducted to explore effects of different orders of 
presentation as well as determine which order would produce the most profit 
for the seller.  
 
The experiment is possibly the first controlled experiment of auction 
sequence in large, competitive auctions using an approach that originated 
with laboratory experimental economics techniques and exploring ideas 
based on intuition drawn from modern auction theory.  Indeed, in terms of 
scale the experiment is unique with the seller committing on the order of 
$13M in assets to the test.    
 
The results were essentially the exact opposite of our expectations. Our 
expectations were drawn from rather common sense applications of auction 
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theory as well as auction theory with a single seller selling multiple items 
with possible asymmetric information, which is the most frequently 
analyzed environment found in the literature.  We expected the most 
profitable strategy would be to offer vehicles in the sequence starting with 
the highest valued then and moving on to offer vehicles that would 
ordinarily have lower values.  As it turns out, the data tell us that offering the 
lower valued vehicles first is more profitable.    
 
 
2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND EXPERIMENAL DESIGN 
 
In the experiment, we implemented four especially crafted selling strategies 
but were able to study two additional strategies, the first was the strategy 
traditionally used by the seller and the second was a strategy that is common 
among large sellers.  The strategies examined are: 
1. (HL) Offer vehicles from highest potential value to the lowest 
without regard to make or model. 
2. (LH) Offer vehicles from the lowest potential value to the highest 
without regard to make or model. 
3. (GHL) Group vehicles according to make and model and offer 
vehicles from highest potential value to lowest within groups. The seller was 
asked to offer groups starting with the highest but it is not clear from the 
data that this was successfully implemented. 
4. (GLH) Group vehicles according to make and model and offer 
vehicles from lowest potential value to highest within groups. The seller was 
asked to order the groups beginning with the lowest valued group but it is 
not obvious from the data that this was successfully implemented. 
5. (T) The seller’s traditional method, which was to offer vehicles in 
make and model, groups according to the number of the vehicles, with the 
most numerous being offered first. 
 6. (C) Following the experiment, the seller was involved in a merger 
and after the merger appeared to adopt the same ordering strategy used by 
other large sellers.  The strategy is similar to GHL in the sense that the 
vehicles are offered with a slight downward trend in value over the course of 
the auction.  This allowed us to include a sixth “treatment”, namely the 
pattern commonly used by large sellers. The change in strategy as a result of 
the merger allowed us to compare the auction performance of the after 
merger strategy against other strategies. 
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In addition to the different sequences, the seller was instructed to implement 
no reserve prices. That is, the seller was instructed to sell all vehicles 
regardless of price that might emerge. 
 
The experimental design called for using different selling strategies on 
different auction days.  That is, different sequences would be used by the 
seller on different sales days. However, the sequencing of vehicles was not 
strictly under our control.  The seller has local managers who are responsible 
for the sales and these managers are responsible for the selection of vehicles 
to be placed at auction in any given week and other organizational aspects of 
the sale including the order with which the vehicles are presented.  While 
our instructions to the manager were always clear, our request was sometime 
not implemented as strictly as one might want. 
 
The sequence in Table 1 gives the dates and conditions under which various 
treatments were implemented.  
 
TABLE 1 : EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Auction 
Number 
Date Sequence implemented Number of 
vehicles 
offered/sold* 
% 
Sold 
 
1 1/08/04 Seller Traditional 113/98 87 
2 1/15/04 Seller Traditional 66/62 94 
4 1/29/04 Seller Traditional 116/108 93 
6 2/12/04 Grouped High to Low 131/126 96 
8 2/26/04 Grouped Low to High 108/100 93 
10 3/11/04 Seller Traditional 123/118 96 
12 3/25/04 Seller Traditional 99/94 95 
14 4/08/04 Low to High 97/97 100 
16 4/22/04 High to Low 87/83 95 
18 5/06/04 Low to High 86/75 87 
20 5/20/04 Grouped High to Low 111/108 97 
22 6/03/04 Grouped High to Low 88/83 94 
24 6/17/04 Grouped Low to High 103/94 91 
26 7/01/04 Grouped High to Low 95/86 91 
28 7/15/04 High to Low 79/76 96 
32 7/26/04 Common Pattern 110/103 94 
34 8/12/04 Common Pattern 64/55 86 
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* Vehicles listed with a positive sale price are counted as sold. In some 
cases, circumstances arising after the auction may cause title not to be 
transferred. 
 
 
3. THE AUCTION ENVIRONMENT 
 
The experiment took place on alternate Thursday’s beginning on February 
12, 2004 through July 15, 2004. The results reported also used data from the 
first second and fourth weeks of January 2004. These are the weeks during 
which the seller had vehicles offered at the auction. We also include data 
from the first two weeks after a merger, which resulted in the seller changing 
the strategy from the strategy traditionally used by the seller. 
 
The Agents 
 
While some participants, especially large sellers, take part only on one side 
of the auction, others will appear both as sellers and buyers. A car dealer, for 
example, may receive vehicles as trade-ins that are subsequently sold at the 
auction, and, also, buy cars to place on sale at the dealer’s lot. The majority 
of the vehicles brought to the auction are brought by a few large sellers. 
These sellers also account for the majority of the sales as the larger dealers 
(those bringing 50 to 75 vehicles or more) sell a higher proportion of their 
vehicles than do smaller sellers. Buyers, on the other hand, generally are 
small with the majority of purchases made by individuals buying half a 
dozen or less 
 
Each auction participant is identified by a seven digit number. This number 
is kept over time so that it is possible to follow an individual through and 
across auctions. 
 
The Vehicles 
 
The large seller that posed the question for research typically sells hundreds 
of vehicles per week at various auction houses scattered across the country.  
The vehicles are generally from one to three years old, have low mileage, 
and are in good repair.  The vehicles also span a large range of vehicle 
makes and models.     
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The Information 
 
In these particular auctions, there seems to be public information about the 
properties of the vehicle.  While there might be a common value issue about 
the possible resale value of a vehicle, the buyers are all professionals who 
operate car dealerships and used car dealerships and have a detailed 
understanding of their own market.  Other than the reservation price of the 
seller, there is very little by way of private information about a common 
value.  Basically, all information is shared so there is no particular role for 
models of information aggregation or the operation of a winner’s curse. The 
vehicles are available for inspection by buyers before the auction and the 
vehicles are accompanied by a quality assessment report that details any 
defects.  The auction house provides a type of “guarantee” that gives a buyer 
the right to return the vehicle should it prove to be defective or have some 
problem about which the buyer was not made aware.  In this case, the seller 
has a reputation for delivering high quality and reliable vehicles. 
The auction house is large, with automobile sales operating throughout the 
United States and other countries.  Data used from these sales are used by 
the auction house to compute an estimate of vehicle value.  We will call this 
the book value or sometimes simply the vehicle value.  This estimate is 
based on nationwide sales and reflects many aspects of the vehicle condition 
and markets.  It is typically based on national market data and it is made 
available to both buyers and sellers in the auction. The auction house also 
maintains regional indices, but the one for southern California was not 
available for all the auction dates. 
As will be made clear later, the value index was tested as an estimate of sale 
price of a vehicle.  This estimate was also used in determining key aspects of 
the experimental design.  In particular, it was used to determine the order in 
which vehicles were offered for sale in the experimental design. 
 
The Physical Environment 
 
The auction site has twelve lanes for vehicles. The vehicles in the lanes 
move towards the auction stands as vehicles ahead of them leave the sales 
area. The setting is similar to that described by Genesove (1995).  Each 
auction stand has an auctioneer, clerk, and, often, the seller or a seller’s 
representative. The auctioneers chant during the auction and their chants are 
amplified, resulting in extremely high volume of sound (the clerks, who type 
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records of transactions generally wear earplugs). The lanes are adjacent and 
buyers can, and do, move from lane to lane during the course of the sale. 
Buyers can see the vehicles approaching the sales area, and the auctioneers 
“advertise” by putting out lists of the vehicles coming through their lanes. 
Thus, if buyers want to buy a particular vehicle, they can be in a lane in 
which that vehicle is offered for sale. When a vehicle is in the sales area, an 
electronic board gives the details of the vehicle including whether the seller 
has purchased a warranty. Once a vehicle is within a designated area in front 
of the sales area, buyers are free to inspect the vehicle including inspecting 
the motor.  
 
The auction house did allow some bidding from remote sights using the 
internet, but at the time of the experiment, few cars were sold through that 
mechanism. During the period of the experiment, fewer than two percent of 
the vehicles sold were sold to buyers on the net, with the figure for the seller 
of interest being somewhat higher (four percent). Internet participants must 
sign up for the auctions and must choose from a limited number of lanes 
usually those used by manufacturers or large finance companies. These 
sellers unlike on site buyers may not place bids in all lanes. 
 
The vehicles offered by a seller enter the auction consecutively and in a 
single lane. Larger sellers typically have the vehicles in low numbered or 
middle lanes. The lanes are numbered by distance from the entrance. So, 
anyone leaving or entering the auction must go past lane one. The auctions 
studied are closed auctions being open only to dealers. 
    
Auction Architecture 
 
The auction architecture is an ascending price, open outcry auction managed 
by a professional auctioneer. The sale is made when no additional bids are 
received by the auctioneer and the seller has indicated to the auctioneer that 
the bid is above an unobserved seller reserve price.  
 
Vehicles are driven in their respective lanes from the parking area.  As the 
vehicle approaches, the auctioneer begins the classical auction chant, 
lowering price until a bid is received.  At that point, the auctioneer asks for 
higher bids.  Active bidders inspect the vehicle while making frequent eye 
contact with the auctioneer.  A nod, yell, finger movement or other signal 
signifies a bid that the auctioneer repeats and asks for a higher bid.  
Occasionally, the auctioneer will say “selling” which means that the current 
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price is above the seller’s asking price and that the high bid will result in a 
sale but this revelation is at the seller’s discression.   
 
 
4. THEORIES AND MODELS 
 
The question posed by the seller focused on the order and grouping in which 
the vehicles are offered for sale.  The issue has been addressed both 
theoretically and experimentally with the primary focus being on the case of 
a monopolist who is offering commodities characterized by asymmetric 
information.  The general thrust of the research is that the best strategy from 
the seller’s point of view, if the ascending price auction is to be used, the 
best strategy is to offer the most valuable items first (Charkraborty, Gupta 
and Harbaugh, 2006; Goeree, Offerman and Schram, 2006; Pitchik, 2004) 
with some exceptions (Raviv, 2004).  By contrast, this study is focused on a 
situation in which there is very little asymmetric information about 
heterogeneous goods and the auction is competitive in the sense that many 
other sellers are offering the goods in the auction, some of which are offered 
at the same time.  Thus, the elements of strategy must focus not only on the 
behavior of the bidders but also on the behavior of other sellers and the 
sequence in which they offer their commodities. 
 
The Classical Model And The Crowd 
 
In the absence of issues of common values, the theory of price determination 
in an ascending price auction is known to operate according to simple 
principles (McAfee and McMillan (1987), Milgrom (2004), Plott and 
Salmon (2004)).  The basic model is very well known and is illustrated in 
Figure 1, which is sufficient as a foundation for developing the theoretical 
intuition of the experimental design. 
A key concept is the "crowd", the bidders that are physically able to tender a 
bid for the vehicle.  Unless a bidder has the capacity to bid electronically, 
the crowd is the set of potential bidders that have eye contact with the 
auctioneer. During the few seconds that the auction of a particular vehicle 
lasts the buyers must either be physically or electronically present in the lane 
where a vehicle is auctioned.  Only those in the crowd can tender bids and 
are thus eligible buyers. 
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Assume only one item is for sale and that the values of bidders in the 
“crowd” are represented by the demand function in panel A.  The values for 
the vehicle at auction are shown for each of the bidders in the “crowd”.  We 
are abstracting from expectations of later sales, vehicles that might be in 
other lanes and the number of vehicles that the agent might have already 
purchased.  We focus only on the value placed on that vehicle, at that time 
by those able to place a bid, the “crowd”.  The demand curve shown 
represents the limit prices of that set of potential buyers.  
The auctioneer begins with low bids with bids moving upward until the 
bidder with the second highest limit value drops out which will occur when 
the price reaches the bidders limit value.  The item will be sold to the agent 
with the highest limit value at a price equal to the limit value of the agent 
with the second highest limit value.  This is shown by P1. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
According to this model, the only ways in which the final price will change 
is if the limit value of the second highest bidder changes.  Suppose for 
example that two additional bidders are drawn to the crowd and that both of 
their limit values are above P1 but below the value of the agent in A with the 
highest limit value.  The changed demand function will shift to the curve 
shown in panel B. The price will be P2, the limit value of the new bidder.  
P1 
P
P1 
2 
A B 
Figure 1
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Thus, the model suggests that the price is determined by the composition of 
the buyers who happened to be in the crowd at the time of the sale and that 
the strategy of influencing the prices of a particular seller turns on success in 
attracting an appropriate crowd for the sales of that seller’s vehicles.  The 
buyers should be in the seller’s lane and not in a lane in which the vehicles 
of a competitive seller are being auctioned. 
 
The Auctioneer 
 
Auctioneers discuss many variables as important determinants of a vehicle’s 
value at auction.  In some sectors, the auctioneer chant is thought to be 
important, creating an atmosphere of competition that draws on a primitive 
value of “winning” and induces higher bids in the process. Auctioneers 
would like to encourage impulse buying and impatience while encouraging 
more aggressive bidding. Auctioneers will attempt to lower transactions 
costs, calling bidders from the restaurant or drawing bidder’s attention to 
specific vehicles that the auctioneer thinks the bidder might like.  Typically, 
an auctioneer works a specific lane during the day but switches do occur.   
 
Seller Characteristics and Policies 
 
Sellers operate differently in an attempt to add value to their vehicles.  Some 
sellers clean the vehicle carefully, including cosmetic repairs while other 
sellers do not. The policies of sellers are scrutinized according to whether or 
not the seller is willing to sell the vehicle at the price that emerges from the 
auction.  A seller can get a reputation for placing high reservation prices on 
vehicles, not selling and using the bidding information as an estimate of the 
market value of the vehicle.  Knowing this, bidders might hesitate to join the 
crowd.  Some sellers bring only quality vehicles to the auction thereby 
enhancing the confidence of the buyers.  Seller size alone could be important 
since visibility and information about policies both adjust with scale. 
 
Sequence 
 
The question posed for study was whether the sequence that this seller uses 
to offer vehicles for sale could be used to influence the seller’s crowds in a 
way that will increase sales revenues. Time, physical presence and attention 
of buyers are scarce resources.  The larger the crowd the greater is the 
likelihood that the second highest limit value is high, so any increase in the 
size of the crowd, other things equal, could have an upward influence on 
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price.  Thus, strategies that might increase the size of the crowd should be 
considered.  Strategies that attract buyers with high limit values should also 
be considered.  
Several things were considered in developing strategy options. Many buyers 
have budget constraints. They are professional buyers who are acting on 
direction of a dealer or used car lot owner who uses the budget as a means of 
direction and control.  Secondly, from the point of view of a buyer, there 
might be many substitutes for a particular vehicle. Some buyers might find 
substitutes only in a given make, model, or condition while others might 
look only to a price range.  Some buyers tend to specialize according to 
make, models, and conditions while others seem to be more flexible.  
Naturally, these properties of the buyers reflect their assessment of the retail 
markets in which they will resell the vehicles they purchase at auction. 
The tendency to specialize suggests that buyers who have a particular 
preference will linger in a lane so long as the types of vehicles they want 
appear in the lane with sufficient frequency.  This suggests that grouping 
vehicles according to make and model could attract and hold a crowd and 
thus influence the prices on all of the vehicles of a particular type.  On the 
other hand, the existence of the budget constraints suggests that limit prices 
may decrease as the sale moves on in time.  Buyers who have purchased a 
vehicle have less money to spend on additional vehicles.  A strategy that 
attracts buyers and places buyers with high limit values in competition might 
be effective. This suggests two possibilities for sequences. Offer the vehicles 
from highest value to the lowest value and/or group the vehicles according 
to their similarities such as make, model and condition.  By offering vehicles 
with the highest values first, the buyers with the highest limit values are 
competing at a time when they had the least constraining budgets. By 
grouping the vehicles, the potential synergies between vehicles of a given 
type would hold the crowd. 
 
 
5. DATA 
 
The full data set includes auctions for every week from the beginning of 
November 2003 to the present (except for two weeks missing in late 
February and early March of 2004). Each week between 2,000 and 3,000 
vehicles are put up for sale.  For every vehicle, the data give the 
identification number of the seller, lane, time, vehicle identification number 
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(VIN), make, model, body, model year, mileage, J D Powers category and 
subcategory, condition at time of auction (frequently blank), value of the 
vehicle as determined by the auction house (similar to Kelly Blue Book 
value), floor price if the seller states them, any fees paid by seller and 
whether the vehicle was sold. The vehicles are all suitable for individual or 
family use and include pickup trucks, SUVs, vans, sport cars as well as 
sedans. For sales, the sales price is given as is the identification number of 
the buyer.  Sellers are given a code to distinguish fleet operators, lease 
sellers, factory, dealers and repossessions. In addition, there is a field labeled 
“Seller Group” which is usually blank or indicates the seller is a dealer, but 
serves to identify most of the largest sellers (HRTZ, ENT, GMAC etc.). 
There are some obvious errors in the data. Transactions taking place at time 
zero, duplicates, obvious typos, for example a car with a floor price of  
$350002, vehicles without a seller number or value were all dropped. We 
also eliminated all sales listed in lanes greater than twelve. These represent 
transactions, of vehicles often in poor condition, which do not go through 
the standard auction process and are not considered here. 
 
The data set used in this paper consists of 29,408 vehicles 67% of which 
were sold. Sellers bringing 50 or more vehicles in a week accounted for 
14,202 transactions with a sales rate of 83%. Half the purchases were made 
by buyers who bought four vehicles or fewer, and for those who made more 
than one purchase the median time between first and last buys was 68 
minutes. Thus, most buyers participate in the auctions over relatively short 
time periods. Though we do not know this, we assume that once buyers have 
made the purchases they wish, they simply leave the auction site. Half of 
those making multiple purchases changed lanes two or more times (the 
maximum was 18).  
 
Since the VIN is included in the data for each vehicle, we can track vehicles 
to see how many of them appear multiple times.  In the entire sample 
including those weeks in which our seller was not present, 22 percent of the 
transactions involved vehicles that had appeared in the auction previously. 
Some of these are brought back several times by the same sellers (the 
maximum is twelve times), others are purchased and subsequently resold by 
their buyers. In the sample used in this paper, 6524 or 35% of the 
transactions involved known repeaters and only 34% of them were sold. 
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6. RESULTS 
 
The results are organized in two sections. The first focuses on the 
development of a baseline against which strategies can be measured.  The 
second subsection develops the broad patterns of strategies that can be 
recognized as being employed by the sellers.  
 
Baseline Measurement 
 
What would be the price of a vehicle under "normal" selling conditions? 
Two such background measures were considered for determining baseline 
measurements.  The first is an estimated value provided by the auction house 
and the second is a floor price that is sometimes imposed by the seller.  
 
The value estimate provided by the auction house is based on the national 
pattern and historical sales.  The auction house operates many auctions and 
has a broad database from which sales value can be estimated.  Our first 
question is whether or not this value estimate is a good predictor of price in 
the local auction of the field experiment. It is important to note that this 
estimate is based on national numbers and the not regional numbers from the 
region of the auction studied here. The auction house maintains regional 
indices, but we use the national index as the figures for southern California 
were not available for all the auction dates. 
 
Result 1.  The value estimate constructed by the auction house is a good 
predictor of selling price. 
 
Support.  For the data used in this paper, a simple regression of sales price 
against the book values given by the auction house gives an R2 of 0.92 with 
a coefficient of 0.993 (which, because of the large number of observations; 
20,111, is significantly different from one). Recall that this is using the 
national rather than the regional numbers. 
 
The second potential tool for use as a baseline value measure is a "floor 
price" sometimes stated by the seller.  As noted, most of the vehicles 
brought to the auctions are brought by a few large sellers. Some of these 
sellers state what are called “floor prices” for the vehicles they bring to 
auction, but others do not. Of the vehicles sold for which floor prices are 
given, between fifty and sixty percent of the sales take place at prices below 
the floor prices. Thus, these prices should be thought of as target prices or 
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aspiration levels rather than as reservation prices.  The floor price is not 
listed sufficiently often to use as a consistent baseline, however, we ask if its 
addition removes some of the error of the auction house prediction.  As is 
stated in the next result the answer is yes. 
 
RESULT 2.  Addition of the seller stated floor price to the price prediction 
equation improves the accuracy of the prediction. 
 
Support. If we add the floor price the R2 rises from .92 to 0.96 with 
coefficients on the index and floor price of .463 and .531 respectively (the 
sum is significantly different from one!). Using floor prices alone yields a 
coefficient of 0.95 and an R2    of 0.94. 
 
Thus, as can be inferred from Result 2, a possibility exists that additional 
dimensions of value of a vehicle that are not in the measures from national 
data are available to the professional agents participating in the local  
market. In particular the national averages are not adjusted for the vehicle’s 
condition at time of sale, while floor prices seem to take that into account. 
 
Other Seller Strategies 
 
With the auction house value estimates as a baseline, we can study the 
strategies used by sellers. The strategies adopted by most of the larger sellers 
are at least superficially similar. Most of them order the vehicles at the 
auction with values that decline somewhat with the vehicles offered first 
being of higher values than those offered last. Figure 2 shows a typical 
pattern. 
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Figure 2 
 
For the data in Figure 2 a simple regression of value against time measured 
in seconds gives an R2 of 0.15 with a significant negative coefficient.  Not 
surprisingly the sale prices also tend to decrease somewhat over time so that 
these data exhibit the “declining price anomaly” common to art auctions (see 
Ashenfelter and Graddy, 2003, Beggs and Graddy (1997), van den Berg et 
al. (2001)). The seller we worked with deviated from this pattern as their 
values show little of no trend over the course of an auction (Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3 
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We have labeled this the traditional order as it is the order used prior to the 
experiments that are discussed later. When asked to explain the order that 
was used we were told that they simply put “the cars we have the most of 
first.” Given their superior performance in the auction, we suspect that 
something more sophisticated was being done. 
 
While some large sellers sold their vehicles at prices that were on average 
equal to or somewhat larger than the values calculated by the auction house, 
others adopted quite different strategies. One set of sellers (called skimmers) 
generally only sold their vehicles at premiums over the values and showed 
average markups substantially above those of the more typical sellers. These 
sellers held out for higher prices and got them, but sold a lower fraction of 
the vehicles put on sale. Figure 4 plots the sales prices against the auction 
house values for a typical large seller. 
 
 
Figure 4 
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Figure 5 has a plot of prices and values for a skimmer. 
 
 
Figure 5 
 
One seller stood out as unlike any other large seller. Most vehicles were sold 
below the values, often for substantial discounts. Average markups varied 
from week to week with values in the neighborhood of -.08 or -.14 being 
typical. Figure 6 plots sales prices against value for this seller at one auction 
prior to July. 
 
 
Figure 6 
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Figure 7 
 
Figure 7 shows the same graph for this seller at an auction in July. 
Beginning in July and up to the present time, that seller has abandoned the 
strategy of selling its vehicles below value. While we cannot explain why 
the seller changed strategies, it appears that what the seller is currently doing 
is to offer many of its vehicles outside of the twelve numbered lanes. This 
example illustrates the dynamic nature of the auction as sellers can, and do, 
change their strategies. This puts limits on how large the effect of changing 
order of presentation can be. Imitation or other moves to counter any highly 
effective strategy would possibly follow. 
 
Many of the vehicles sold by this seller were purchased and later resold at 
the auction. One buyer in particular seemed to specialize in this. This buyer 
purchased 264 vehicles from January through the present time of which 261 
were bought from the one seller. These vehicles were later put up for sale 
getting prices near book value. Presumably, the buyer had a repair shop and 
was able to fix whatever shortcomings had depressed the prices at the first 
sale. The vehicles brought to the auction by the large “discounter” were 
disproportionately listed with condition “PR” or “RG”. Vehicles with these 
conditions in their descriptions typically sold for substantial discounts. 
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Effects of Strategic Choice of Sequence 
 
Two methods of evaluating the effects of sequence were used: a regression 
method with dummy variables for the six treatments and the second is a 
comparison of what happened to the seller as compared to various groups of 
other sellers on the days of the treatments.  The controls were for value, time 
of day, condition of vehicle when known, and date. The first employed a 
regression based on the sales price of the vehicle as compared to the sales 
prices of all other vehicles offered for sale at the auction the day of the sale.  
The second method compared the revenue of the seller using the test 
strategies against the revenue and sales of selected other sellers on the same 
day.  
 
As we have stated, the seller that asked about the possible effects of 
changing the order in which their vehicles were offered for sale had used an 
ordering that appeared different from the orders used by other large sellers. 
For this seller, the values of the first vehicles placed on sale were about the 
same as the values of the later vehicles while other sellers tended to put their 
more valuable vehicles for sale early in the auctions. We asked the seller to 
experiment with four methods of ordering vehicles: high values first then 
low values, low values followed by higher values, vehicles grouped by type 
arranged within groups from high to low valued vehicles and grouped with 
the within group order of low values to high. We did not specify the basis of 
the grouping letting them decide what they thought were the most effective 
methods. In practice, they tended to group by make with models as 
subgroups. Thus, Toyota SUVs would be followed by Camrys, etc. Within 
each subgroup, book values were arranged by the agreed order. As can be 
seen in Figures 8 through 11, the seller did order their cars as we had 
suggested.  
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Figure 8 
 
 
Figure 9 
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Figure 10 
 
 
Figure 11 
 
The estimates from the first method of assessment are in Table 2. We 
estimated regressions with sale price as the dependent variable including the 
auction house’s estimate of the value of the vehicles, dummy variables for 
vehicles in poor, clean, average, excellent, and rough condition, many 
vehicles do not have stated condition variables and they are the control 
category. We also include one dummy variable for each of the orders 
employed and weekly dummies to allow for changing market conditions 
(Table 2).  We excluded transactions in which the difference between the 
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sales price ands value exceeded seventy percent. We also excluded all 
vehicles with estimated values less than $3,000.  Including these 
observations does not change the results significantly. In addition, we 
estimated an equation with substantially the same results using the logarithm 
of the sale price as the dependent variable and an equation in which the 
condition and order variable were interacted with the auction house’s 
estimate of the value of the vehicle. If we restrict the sample to large sellers, 
only (75 vehicles or more brought to the auction), the results are basically 
the same.   
 
 
Table 2 : Regression of sales price  estimated vehicle value and dummy variables for the 
sequence, time in the auction, vehicle condition and week in which the sale was made 
Number of observations = 20111 
F(29,20081) = 6143.11 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.9357 
Root  MSE = 1.41 
sale price Coef Robust 
Std. Err 
t P> |t| 95% Conf. Interval 
value .9854 .0028 343.63 0.000 .9798  .9911 
D_TR .2081 .0725 2.87 0.004 .0659  .3502 
D_HL -.3134 .1147 -2.73 0.006 -.5385  -.0884 
D)LH -.1926 .0958 -0.20 0.841 -.2071  .1685 
D_GHL -.0875 .0770 -1.14 0.256 -.2386  .0635 
D_GLH .1550 .0918 1.69 0.091 -.0249  .3350 
D_C -.1100 .1054 -1.04 0.297 -.3166  .0965 
time -.2257 .0118 -19.00 0.000 -.2490  -.2024 
D_PR -2.3189 .1401 -16.54 0.000 -2.5937 -2.0442 
D_RG -1.2223 .0388 -31.43 0.000 -1.2985 -1.1461 
D_EC .1129 .0921 1.23 0.221 -.0677  .2936 
D_CL .2323 .0427 5.43 0.000 .1484  .3162 
D_AV .0088 .0253 0.35 0.726 -.0407  .0584 
 
All estimates included binary variables for the individual weeks (not shown). 
“value” is the auction house’s estimate of retail value not corrected for 
condition at time of sale. The variables D_TR, D_HL, D_LH, D_GHL, 
D_GLH, and D_C are dummies for the seller’s vehicles in the weeks in 
which they ordered the cars in the traditional way (TR), from high value to 
low (HL), low value to high (LH), grouped high to low within the groups 
(GHL), grouped with low value to high within groups (GLH) and using the 
Commonly Used method that was adopted after the merger (C). The 
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variables D_PR, D_AV, D_CL, D_EC, and D_RG are indicator variables for 
vehicles listed in condition poor, average, clean, excellent, and rough 
respectively. The control category is condition not reported. Prices and 
values are in thousands of dollars and time is measured in hours.  
 
The table provides measurements that account for the sales price of the 
vehicle.  Sales price of vehicle is the (coefficient on the value given the 
sequencing strategy) times value plus adjustments for quality, week and time 
of day.  Thus, a vehicle that was sold using the traditional sequence (TR) 
will typically sell for .985 (auction house value estimate in dollars) +.208 
($1000).  For a vehicle with an estimated value of 10,000 the sale price 
under TR would on average be $10,058 = .985($10,000)+.208($1000) and 
the same vehicle is sold according to the strategy of offering high valued 
vehicles at the first of the sequence of auction, i.e. HL, would be $9,762.40 
= .985($10,000)- .0876 ($1000).  We are ignoring the week of dummies and 
the constant term. 
 
While it is not our focus at this time, Table 2 can be used to form a general 
impression of the nature of these auctions.  Generally, the price of a vehicle 
with a given set of characteristics will decrease with the time at which the 
vehicle is sold.  The condition of the vehicle has a big impact on the price.  
On average, a vehicle in poor condition (PR) will sell for $2,300 less than a 
vehicle with no condition report, which is equivalent to a vehicle in average 
condition (AV).  A vehicle reported as condition RG (rough) will ell for 
$1,200 less than a vehicle with no condition report.  If the vehicle is clean 
(CL) it will sell for $200 more. 
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TABLE 3.Tests of equality of coefficients of the strategies in the regression 
model F(1,20081) and Prob>F 
 
        
 Strategy and regression coefficient 
 
Strategy 
and 
regression 
coefficient 
TR 
 0.21 
GLH 
 0.15 
LH 
 -0.02 
GHL 
 -0.08 
C  
-0.11 
HL 
 -0.31 
 TR 
 0.21 
 
      
 GLH 
 0 .15 
TR=GLH 
0.21 
.6465 
     
 LH 
 -0.02 
TR>LH 
3.66 
.0557 
GLH=LH 
1.75 
.1860 
    
 GHL 
 -0.08 
TR>GHL 
8.07 
.0045 
GLH>GHL
4.18 
.0409 
LH=GHL
0.31 
.5747 
   
 C 
 -0.11 
TR>C 
6.33 
.0119 
GLH>C 
3.65 
.0560 
LH=C 
0.41 
.5206 
GHL=C 
0.03 
.8620 
  
 HL 
 -0.31 
 
TR>HL 
15.01 
.0001 
GLH>HL 
10.27 
.0014 
 
LH>HL 
3.92 
.0477 
GHL>HL 
2.71 
.0997 
C=HL 
1.73 
.1888 
 
 
Result 3. The regression result suggest that the most profitable methods from 
the point of view of the strategic seller are the traditional method (T) and the 
grouped from low to high method (GLH) and the worst method is the 
method of offering vehicles from high to low (HL). 
 
Support. The results follow from the statistics reported in Table 3.  Group 
from low to high (GLH) and the traditional sequencing (T) have roughly the 
same benefits to the seller as measured by the regression coefficients.  The 
benefits of these two are significantly better than all other rules. The 
exception is GLH, which has a higher coefficient than LH (.15 vs -0.02) the 
difference is not significant.  The strategy that is unambiguously the worst as 
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measured by the regression model is the strategy of offering the vehicles 
from high value to low value (HL) without grouping.  The overall difference 
is not as clean as could be since LH and several of the rules (GLH, GHL and 
C) do not differ siginficantly.  
 
The estimates from the second method of evaluation of the different vehicle 
sequencing strategies are contained in Table 4.  The first three columns give 
the average markups for the strategic seller, other large sellers and all other 
sellers during the weeks in which the various treatments were used together 
with t-statistics for testing equality with the strategic seller. The last three 
columns give the ratios between the total sales revenues and the total value 
of the cars sold together with t-statistics for comparing the seller with the 
other large sellers and all other sellers.   
 
Table 4.  Average Markups and Returns. 
 
Average Markup 
 
Return 
 
 
Strategy 
applied by 
strategic 
seller 
Strategic 
Seller 
Other 
large 
sellers 
All other
sellers 
Strategic 
Seller 
Other 
large 
sellers 
All other 
sellers  
     
Traditional .058 .061 
(-0.4) 
.025* 
(4.5) 
.050 .052 
(-0.2) 
 .021* 
(3.5) 
High low .019 .051* 
(-2.7) 
.024 
(-0.3) 
.012 .039* 
(-2.8) 
.012 
(-0.0) 
Low High .050 .034 
(1.5) 
 .022* 
(3.0) 
.034 
 
.028 
(0.7) 
 .007* 
 (2.6) 
Grouped 
High Low 
.017 .019 
(-0.4) 
.014 
(0.7) 
.009 .014 
(-0.8) 
 .010 
 (-0.8) 
Grouped 
Low High 
.048 .008* 
(3.5) 
.020* 
(2.4) 
.029 .024 
(0.5) 
 .009† 
 (2.0) 
Commonly 
used 
.019 .023 
(-0.4) 
0.15 
(0.3) 
.016 
 
.019 
(-0.3) 
 .012 
 (0.4) 
Figures in parentheses are t statistics for testing difference  with the  
corresponding Seller column. 
Traditional Sales 1 2, 4, 10 and12 
High Low Sales 16 and 28 
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Low High Sales 14 and 18 
Grouped High Low Sales 6, 20, 22 and 26 
Grouped Low High Sales 8 and 24 
Commonly Used Sales  32 and 34 
Markup (Sale Price-Book Value)/Book Value 
Return= (Total Revenue/Total Book Value of Cars Sold)    -1 
Large Sellers are those bringing 75 or more cars excluding Seller Low 
*Difference significant p<.01. Other markup differences are not significant. 
† Difference significant p<.05. Other return differences are not significant. 
Standard errors for returns computed by the delta method. 
 
Application of the second approach, the comparison of sellers on the same 
days, yields the following result, which is consistent with Result 3. 
 
RESULT 4. The second approach, the study of returns when compared with 
other sellers, are consistent with Result 3. The most profitable strategies are 
the Traditional (T) and the strategy of offering groups of vehicles in the 
order of low values to high values.  The worst strategy is the strategy of 
offering the vehicles from high values to low values (HL).  Other strategies 
show no evidence of differences among the users.  
  
Support. Table 4 compares sales prices and returns across sellers on the days 
that the strategic seller employed each of the strategies. Where the measured 
markup or returns between the strategic seller and other groups of sellers the 
strategic seller is better off than the other groups and using either T or GLH 
or is worse off than the other groups and using HL. The estimates shown 
indicate that, except for the instances discussed, the order treatments do not 
significantly affect the markup or returns to the strategic seller when 
compared to others on the same day. 
 
 
7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The study is based on a large experiment in which approximately 1000 
vehicles were sold at auction that had on average a value of approximately 
$12,000 each.  So, millions of dollars of goods were manipulated as 
controls.  Management of the experiment involved several large 
organizations and the personnel that deal with day to day auctions, none of 
whom were aware that an experiment was underway.  The variables and 
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controls were implemented as we requested.  All vehicles were sold without 
reserve price as requested. 
 
The basic conclusions are that the sequence in which vehicles are offered for 
sale in a competitive, large scale auction has implications for profitability. In 
particular, for some reason open for theoretical speculation the traditional 
sequence chosen by the strategic seller is one of the two best rules.  
Grouping the vehicles according to type and offering from low valued 
vehicles to the higher valued vehicles is also a “best strategy”.  The worst 
strategy is the one drawn from theoretical intuition drawn from models of a 
monopoly seller – namely that the vehicles should be offered from the 
highest values offered first followed in sequence by lower valued vehicles.  
 
Of course, a key element is the fact that the auction is a competitive auction 
that lasts several hours with buyers who want several vehicles.  The result 
suggests that a sequence that is almost the opposite used by other sellers is a 
key.  While other sellers compete for the attention of the customers that want 
the high valued cars the strategy that seems most profitable for the strategic 
seller is to capture the attention of the all of the buyers who want low valued 
cars.  Then when the other sellers are competing for the attention of the 
buyers who want low valued vehicles, the strategic seller captures the 
attention of all of the sellers who want high valued vehicles.  
 
Interestingly, except for the experiment described above, the strategic seller 
had used what we have called the traditional sequence (TR) until the 
company merged and the selling team was replaced.  After the merger, the 
strategic seller adopted the strategy that appears to us to be indistinguishable 
from the strategy of other sellers and in doing so experienced reduced selling 
prices.  This change of strategy along with other examples of the willingness 
of auction participants to change their strategy underlines the fact that the 
strategies are endogenously determined with the implication that strategies 
that prove successful in the short run might not do so over the long run.  
Nevertheless, this experiment suggests that some sequences produce better 
results for the seller than do others. 
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